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rAbstract
We show that information revealed by the occupation choices of spouses predicts
marital dissolution. Using a novel measure of occupational distance constructed from
the O*Net Content Model, we find that spouses more closely matched in terms of
their occupations' requisite knowledge are more likely to divorce. This supports the
hypothesis that gains from division of labor within a household can render a
marriage more durable. On the other hand, spouses that are dissimilar in terms of
their occupations' activities are more likely to divorce. This suggests that each spouse
brings an inclination toward certain activities to the marriage that reflects compatible
preferences for joint consumption of household public goods.
JEL codes: D13; J12; J24
Keywords: Spousal matching; Marital stability; PSID; O*Net; Gains from marriage
“Baby ain’t it somethin’ how we lasted this long; you and me provin’ everyone
wrong; don’t think we’ll ever get our differences patched; don’t really matter cuz
we’re perfectly matched.”
– Leiber (1990), performed by Paula Abdul and MC Skat Kat
1. Introduction
Previous research finds that the rise of dual-earner households is highly correlated
with rising divorce rates, with ample evidence supporting causality in both directions
[e.g., (Johnson & Skinner, 1986), (Spitze & South, 1985), (Bremmer & Kesselring,
2004), (Ging & Kim, 2011)]. Conditional on both spouses working, however, the de-
terminants of a successful marriage are complex1. In this paper, we use a novel ap-
proach that considers information revealed through current and past occupation
choices in an empirical model of the predictors of a successful (or unsuccessful) mar-
riage, as measured by divorce. We propose that the type of job one chooses, and the
relative distance from their spouse’s job in terms of job content, reveals much about
gains form specialization and relative preferences for household goods, which, in turn
affects marital stability. Our use of occupation data to reveal information about spou-
sal skills and preferences builds on a wide range of research that has shown a correl-
ation between underlying individual traits, both cognitive and non-cognitive, and
occupational choice2.
Although our paper is related to the previous literature that considers marriages in the
context of relative wages and schooling of the spouses [e.g., (Lam, 1988) and (Liu & Lu,
2006)], we eschew rank-order or vertical comparisons of spouses in this paper. WeVan Kammen and Adams; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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dinal significance. Our variables of interest measure dissimilarity between spouses’ occu-
pations on a number of dimensions, which take the form of “distance” measures.
Therefore, they act like cartographic distances in that they do not convey which endpoint
is at higher elevation or latitude. Consequently, these occupation measures can test theor-
ies of marital stability that are either based on similarities of preferences for household
goods or dissimilarities allowing for gains from specialization. Spousal contrasts can be ei-
ther good or bad for a marriage, depending upon which dimensions of the occupations
the distance measures are based.
Our evidence suggests that there are two dimensions of occupation distance that
relate to marital stability and dissolution. First, spouses whose occupational infor-
mation reveals dissimilarity in terms of knowledge are less likely to divorce or separ-
ate. The knowledge-based distance measures most likely capture what the spouses
will be able to produce within the household given the knowledge that each spouse’s
occupation requires. This supports the prediction that households that can divide
tasks based on comparative advantage will be more stable. Second, spouses that are
dissimilar in terms of vocational activities are more likely to divorce. The activities
involved in one’s chosen occupation reveal preferences for activities more generally.
To the extent that couples share activities and consume household public goods,
one’s preferences for activities can be more or less compatible with a spouse’s
preferences.
We extend this analysis to single-earner households as well. As with the literature
on wage sorting among couples, this research must overcome the obstacle of miss-
ing data—namely from spouses that are not earning a wage and have no current oc-
cupation from which to measure distance. Our approach overcomes this using
longitudinal data observing individuals’ earlier occupations. A “synthetic” distance
predicted from characteristics of the spouses is also used as a robustness check.
Combining information gleaned from current occupations, earlier occupations, and
synthetic distances demonstrates that spouses’ joint choices of occupations explains
marital stability, i.e., divorce behavior. Moreover, the effects of distance measures
on divorce probability are evident among single and dual earner households, among
the sub sample of households in which neither spouse has changed occupations
since marriage, and are robust to all of these methods for treating missing data on
single earners.
The paper does not make causal claims about occupations and divorce, since our
model does not simulate random assignment to jobs or spouses, but it is defensible
that occupational dissimilarity measures contain information orthogonal to the
other factors that might influence the labor force participation-marital stability rela-
tionship. Our results should be read as adding explanatory power to empirical di-
vorce models, with the correlations signed as theory predicts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on marital
dissolution, as well as the related literature on spousal matching. Section 3 discusses
the construction of occupational distance measures. Section 4 discusses the data
and methods used in the present examination of marriage and marital dissolution,
and the empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
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2.1 Related literature on the strength of spousal matches
The framework for analyzing formation and dissolution of marriage originates with
Becker (1973, 1974), who describes the household production function with members’
time and market goods as inputs. Becker speculates that the returns to scale of the pro-
duction function are increasing, generating the incentives to marry, and the gains are
magnified if one spouse concentrates on wage earning (providing market goods) and
the other spouse concentrates on direct home production. Among the many extensions
of this basic model is Weiss (1997), who relies on credit constraints to explain the same
sorting mechanism. Specifically the gain from marriage comes from the spouse with
lower wage-earning potential financing human capital investments for the spouse with
higher wage-earning potential. The high potential spouse could not otherwise invest in
this manner because of constraints on borrowing against future income. Weiss (p. 86)
shows that this gain in future income comes from specialization. Thus, two spouses
with equal earning ability do not benefit from marrying one another. These models
imply that the optimal pattern for pairing husbands and wives is negative sorting on
wages—since it maximizes the gains from specialization (see Becker 1973, 826–828).
Sorting according to labor market productivity need not be the extent of the
husband-wife matching mechanism. Mitigating spouses’ earnings risks is another
source of gains from marriage, but without obvious implications for how spouses sort
in terms of productivity level. If each spouse faces uncertainty about the income he or
she will earn, having another person in the household to insure against idiosyncratic
earnings shocks makes both spouses’ expected utilities higher. Naturally the advantage
of such insurance is more limited as the correlation of earnings risk between spouses
grows. The implication is that dissimilar occupations or industries will more effectively
mitigate the risk to household consumption from earnings instability. According to the
risk-sharing theory, marriages between “dissimilarly employed” spouses generate more
gains. We note that dissimilar, here, does not imply an ordinal ranking. We simply
mean that diversification of jobs is good in terms of ensuring some income for the
household.
There are several other reasons to suspect that dissimilar spousal occupations affect
match strength. Lich-Tyler (2003) shows how assortative matching is based on similar
preferences for household public goods in the absence of differences in skills, wages,
etc. Weiss and Willis (1997) found the same basic notion holds with respect to educa-
tion. Specifically the marginal effect of an interaction term consisting of husband’s and
wife’s education decreases the probability of divorce. The authors interpret this as the
result of preference complementarity and shared consumption (p. 316). From this lit-
erature, we postulate that preferences for goods correlate with individuals’ choices of
occupation. Non-wage amenities and disamenities attract individuals to occupations
based on their valuations of the amenities. It is reasonable to expect, for example, two
people who chose to work an outdoor job to also enjoy outdoor leisure activities.
Regardless of whether preferences and labor market traits are correlated, marriage
generates gains for the spouses if non-rival household goods are consumed since
any amount of the good consumed by one partner generates utility for the other
partner. Lam (1988) elaborates on this possibility by exploring two consequences of
a household public good—correlation in preferences for the public good and home
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outdoor leisure) sorting of spouses, and the second suggests negative (specialization-
based) sorting. The latter depends on the public good’s production function and
how complementary the spouses’ time inputs are in terms of allowing for
specialization.
The novel approach of our paper is to use information on occupations to learn
more about spousal compatibility. Given that there is ample evidence from the previ-
ous literature that both similarities and dissimilarities draw spouses together and
make marriages work, we suspect the richness of information about one’s occupation
can shed light on the role of dissimilarities. The risk sharing explanations for match
quality and the idea that dissimilar spouses could more effectively divide tasks in the
household imply that spouses with proximal occupations reap fewer gains from mar-
riage. Alternatively spouses with occupations that are dissimilar could have a disad-
vantage in match quality if the gains from marriage come from preference
compatibility, complementarity in household public good production, or spillover of
human capital within the household. The last idea, suggested by Benham (1974), ar-
gues that one spouse’s earnings are enhanced by the knowledge of the other spouse,
assuming that the other spouse has relevant knowledge. This would be applicable
when both spouses’ occupations are complements in market goods production (e.g.,
physician and nurse). A marriage involving two such occupations could be expected
to make both spouses better at doing their individual jobs, thus generating larger
gains from marriage.
2.2 Additional factors explaining marital dissolution
As with most papers in the literature, our aim is to measure match quality but must
use divorce or separation as a proxy. This relies on the assumption that poorer match
quality renders divorce more likely. Spouses gain information during the marriage
about its quality and the availability of better matches (there may also be some “on the
job search”). Since dissolution is costly, minor adverse realizations do not compel well-
matched spouses to divorce; only marginally-well-matched couples do. The question
we ask in this paper then is: are couples with more distant occupations more likely or
less likely to be marginally-well-matched (ceteris paribus)? Since we use divorce and
separation to reveal marriages that are relatively poor matches, we appeal to the exist-
ing literature on marital dissolution to identify other factors that are important to in-
clude in the analysis as controls. Weiss and Willis (1997) find that shocks to the
earnings of one spouse affect the probability of divorce. Such increases to the husband’s
earnings stabilize the marriage while positive shocks to the wife’s earnings destabilize it.
We interpret this result as suggesting that an increase to the higher-earning spouse sta-
bilizes the marriage, but an increase to the lower-earning spouse destabilizes the mar-
riage. Kalmijn et al. (2007) show that among Dutch couples, the stabilizing effect of
income growth for the higher earner is confirmed—but only when the higher earner is
male. In households in which the dominant earner is female—growth of the wife’s rela-
tive income has a destabilizing effect on the marriage. Similarity in the levels of the
spouses’ schooling at the time of marriage also stabilizes the match, as do higher age at
marriage, duration, children, and marital assets like property. Investments in human
capital after marriage have mixed consequences for marital stability. They increase the
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Moreover, the additional human capital stock provides the spouse that invests more at-
tractive outside options (Johnson & Skinner, 1986).
Demographic variables indicating the spouses’ religious homogamy significantly predict
a lower probability of divorce (Charles & Stephens, 2004). In a CDC study (Bramlett &
Mosher, 2002), ethnic homogamy, the wife being older than the husband, and successful
parental marriages do likewise. Pre-marital cohabitation and previous marriages are posi-
tively correlated with divorce probabilities in the Bramlett and Mosher CDC report as well
as in other samples (Weiss & Willis, 1997, pp. 313–15). Living in an area with high male
unemployment, a greater proportion in poverty, a higher proportion receiving welfare,
and lower median income each predicts higher divorce probability, according to the same
CDC study, as does the race of the wife. Lehrer (2008) uses the same data (the National
Survey of Family Growth) set to confirm that age-at-marriage is positively related to
stability.
Job displacement, particularly layoffs (as opposed to plant closures), adversely affects
marital stability (Charles & Stephens, 2004). This finding has been confirmed for un-
employment of husbands using Danish data (Jensen & Smith, 1990). Geographical move-
ment also tends to destabilize marriages because the motive is usually a new job for one
spouse and this tends to benefit that spouse more than the other (Boyle et al. 2008). In
Norwegian households, receipt of public transfers, particularly through the wife, increases
the likelihood of divorce (Tjotta & Vaage, 2008). Blackburn (2003) finds that this
phenomenon is unrelated to the generosity of welfare programs for single mothers as wel-
fare programs for single mothers do not incentivize divorce for women. Finally, living in an
area with greater availability of other mates increases the probability of divorce (South &
Lloyd, 1995) as does working in an occupation with greater availability of other mates
(McKinnish, 2007). This literature guides our choice of covariates in regressions.
3. Measuring the distance between any two occupations
The innovation in this paper is the construction of a measure of occupational distance
that can be used on pairs of spouses to test various theories of marriage. The information
for measuring occupational proximity comes from the O*Net Content Model: “The
O*NET database contains several hundred variables that represent descriptors of work
and worker characteristics, including skill requirements” (O*Net, 2011). The activities,
abilities, knowledge and skills files contain the variables we use to measure distance be-
tween occupations3. Version (16.0) of the database from O*Net consists of scores, from
worker and occupational expert questionnaires, assessing the relevance of the various ac-
tivities, abilities, knowledge, and skills to each occupation4.
Relevance is measured on two (ordinal) scales for each occupational dimension: import-
ance (1 to 5) and level (0 to 7). The importance scale is accompanied by typical linear, nu-
meric scale language, such as “not important” and “extremely important”. The level scale
is accompanied by “anchors” that communicate what constitutes a minimal level of per-
formance and what constitutes a sophisticated level. For example, the anchors for ability
code, “1.A.2.b.2: Multi-limb Coordination” are shown below.
Level 2 Anchor: “Row a boat”
Level 4 Anchor: “Operate a forklift truck in a warehouse”
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The ordinal nature of these data poses a practical problem, and so does the existence
of two scales per variable. One might worry that the average of the scores among re-
spondents from an occupation is meaningless except in comparison to averages for that
occupation on other dimensions—or to other occupations’ averages on the same di-
mension. A few features of the scores ameliorate this problem, however.
1. A dimension on which the average respondent in an occupation scores higher than
another dimension can be regarded as more important (at a more sophisticated
level) to the occupation.
2. An occupation in which the average respondent scores a dimension higher than the
average respondent from another occupation can be regarded as more important
(higher level) to the occupation with the higher average score.
Together these features, along with a ranking of each occupation on each dimension,
make it possible to compare a pair of occupations according to their places in the dis-
tributions of the various O*Net dimensions. Following this premise, we construct mea-
sures of the distance between each pair of occupations based on rank, as well as the
raw scores. Although the results reported in the paper use the distances based on raw
scores, the results are robust to using the rank-based distances as well.
The second problem we confront is the existence of two scales per variable. There
are two distinct, yet consequentially similar, options for treating them: 1) treat import-
ance scores as separate dimensions or 2) treat them as weights. The two (in the Euclid-
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where, Wik ¼ IMPikX
k∈K
IMPik
K includes only level scores.
We prefer the second formula, which uses the relative importance scores as weights,
because it distinguishes between level and importance. Instead of counting all level and
importance scores equally, the weighted version counts level scores that are important
to both occupations heavily and those that are unimportant (to at least one) only
slightly. Only if the two occupations differ on important characteristics will they be
measured as “far away” by this measure, whereas unimportant differences could result
in an overstatement of the distance as measured in number 1. Consequently this paper
employs the second (importance weights) calculation of distance between occupations.
Once again, however, we have estimated the divorce model using non-importance-
weighted distances and the estimates are robust to this.
There are four O*Net files utilized in the preceding exercise: abilities, activities, skills,
knowledge. A distance measure can be calculated for each of the four—as well as an
“overall” measure. The usefulness inheres in evaluating the proximity of any pair of
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of occupations—as defined in the 2000 Census classification scheme. Then the mea-
sures can be matched to observed pairs of occupations (one per spouse) in any
household-level micro data including spousal pairs.
4. Data and methods
4.1 Data
The household-level data in which we observe marriages dissolve or succeed come
from the 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves of the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics
public use dataset 2003–2007). Consecutive observations of each household provide
married couples’ characteristics and their marital status 2 years later. A binary (“remain
married” equals 0) variable for marital status in the future period is the dependent vari-
able5. Our sample consists of couples that are married in the current period and in
which at least one reports an occupation.
The PSID contains a wealth of control variables as well; nearly all of the correlates of
divorce found in earlier literature are available (or can be imputed). There are 4142 ob-
servations of married dual-earning couples in the pooled sample (those married in
2003, 2005 or both) and 1070 observations in which just one spouse works. Table 1 re-
ports summary statistics for relevant variables from the 2003 wave.
There are a few limitations that we face when constructing control variables that are
noteworthy in comparison with the rest of the literature. We do not explicitly observe
pre-marital cohabitation in the sample. Also the survey only asks about marital status
of the parents of the head of the household and not the spouse. So we only observe
whether one of the spouses has parents that remained married during childhood. Vari-
ables indicating the receipt of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and
“other welfare” exist in the PSID, but a very small number of respondents (18) report
receiving any welfare. We have not included these variables because of the trivial extent
to which they vary.
4.2 Methods
The empirical methods and notation follow Charles and Stephens (2004, pp. 496–97)
and Weiss and Willis (1997) closely. A couple’s separation hazard at a given time, con-
ditional on having remained married as long as they have, depends on the gain in utility
they get when married compared to dissolution (net of costs): With Vt representing
utility from marital in year t,
V t ¼ G spouses′inputs tð Þð Þ þ βEtfmax½V tþ1; net utility t þ 1ð Þj singletonsg
þ μi þ εitð Þ−net utility tð Þ singletons: ð3Þj
The utility consists of the value of marriage, in three parts: present household utility
(G), an expectation of future utility, and a stochastic part, expressed net of the oppor-
tunity cost of marriage. Spouses remain married when the utility is positive and dis-
solve the marriage otherwise. In our paper, the objects of interest are variables in the
match-fixed (“quality”) effect, μi, which makes the gains larger and the match less likely
to dissolve. Under Charles’s and Stephens’s assumptions, the separation hazard (S) is a
Table 1 Summary statistics of key variables
Pooled One earners Two earners
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Distance bw Spouses' Occupations 'Abilities' File - - - - 0.123 0.050
Distance bw Spouses' Occupations 'Activities' File - - - - 0.196 0.071
Distance bw Spouses' Occupations 'Skills' File - - - - 0.159 0.067
Distance bw Spouses' Occupations 'Knowledge' File - - - - 0.270 0.093
|Age(Male)-Age(Female)| 3.488 3.541 3.648 3.781 3.447 3.477
Years Married (Imputed) 15.111 12.019 20.116 14.576 13.840 10.922
Age of Man When Married 29.270 8.917 29.153 10.006 29.300 8.621
Age of Woman When Married 27.082 8.241 26.913 9.073 27.125 8.018
Female is Older Than Male (=1) 0.202 0.401 0.215 0.411 0.199 0.399
Spouses are same religion (=1) 0.766 0.423 0.799 0.401 0.758 0.429
Husband is white 0.715 0.451 0.725 0.447 0.713 0.453
Husband is black 0.195 0.396 0.174 0.380 0.200 0.400
Wife is white 0.726 0.446 0.733 0.443 0.724 0.447
Wife is black 0.190 0.392 0.176 0.381 0.194 0.395
Spouses are same race (=1) 0.940 0.238 0.950 0.219 0.937 0.243
Head's Parents Intact (=1) 0.784 0.412 0.793 0.406 0.782 0.413
Years Education Head 13.396 2.625 13.168 2.901 13.454 2.548
Years Education Spouse 13.452 2.452 13.133 2.555 13.533 2.420
|Education(Head)-Education(Spouse)| 1.513 1.632 1.563 1.605 1.500 1.639
Product of HHs and Wife's Yrs Educ 184.180 57.460 177.896 62.081 185.777 56.130
Male Spouse's earnings in 1000s 50.261 102.447 54.941 169.437 49.072 76.637
Female Spouse's earnings in 1000s 23.650 24.963 7.357 24.370 27.790 23.372
Female Spouse earns more==1 0.270 0.444 0.228 0.420 0.281 0.449
City Pop. > = 500 k 0.140 0.347 0.132 0.338 0.142 0.349
100 k < City Pop. < 500 k 0.253 0.435 0.236 0.425 0.257 0.437
50 k < City Pop. < 100 k 0.114 0.317 0.110 0.314 0.114 0.318
25 k < City Pop. < 50 k 0.130 0.337 0.130 0.336 0.131 0.337
10 k < City Pop. < 25 k 0.171 0.377 0.199 0.400 0.164 0.370
1 Kid 0.219 0.414 0.166 0.373 0.233 0.423
2 Kids 0.239 0.426 0.230 0.421 0.241 0.428
3 Kids 0.082 0.274 0.077 0.267 0.083 0.276
4 Kids 0.024 0.152 0.044 0.206 0.018 0.134
5 or More Kids 0.007 0.086 0.012 0.107 0.006 0.080
Owns Home 0.821 0.384 0.818 0.386 0.821 0.383
Have Consumer or Student Debt (=1) 0.572 0.495 0.470 0.500 0.598 0.491
Contributed to IRA or Pvt. Annuity (=1) 0.207 0.405 0.190 0.392 0.212 0.409
Exactly one spouse smokes (=1) 0.182 0.386 0.195 0.397 0.179 0.383
Moved last year(=1) 0.267 0.442 0.215 0.411 0.280 0.449
Variance of Husband's Occupation Earnings - - - - 0.749 2.240
Variance of Wife's Occupation Earnings - - - - 0.592 1.521
Earnings Covariance (Pair of Occupations) - - - - 0.054 0.777
Head Married > Once (=1) 0.254 0.435 0.275 0.447 0.248 0.432
Spouses Employed Same Industry (=1) - - - - 0.114 0.317
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Table 1 Summary statistics of key variables (Continued)
Sample size 2606 535 2071
The sample summarized in this table is the 2003 cross-section of the PSID.
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and the match-fixed effects:
Sit ¼ g durationit ; spousal inputsit ; opportunity costsit ; match qualityi½ ; ð4Þ
∂Sit
 where ∂μi < 0 , and the effects can be estimated using a probit model:
Pr y ¼ yjjX
 
¼ f Φ Xβð Þ½ : ð5Þ
In equation (5), f is the probit function and yj ∈ {0, 1}. The outcome variable, y, equals 1
if the couple is separated or divorced; it equals 0 if they remain married. X is the vector of
explanatory variables listed in Table 1. Charles and Stephens and Weiss and Willis
attempted to estimate the match-fixed effects, but their main focus was on earnings
shocks. We are directly interested in measures of match-specific quality in this paper,
however. The previous studies used variables such as demographic and educational hom-
ogamy to capture match-fixed effects. The present paper can be viewed as moving this lit-
erature a step forward by incorporating additional match-quality measures based on
heterogamy in X, specifically measured through the spouses’ occupations.
The danger in relying on dissimilarity measures based on the spouses’ occupations is
that features of the occupations, themselves, factor into the marital value function. Spe-
cifically occupational characteristics may contribute directly to household utility (1st
term in (3)), and they may also reveal the value of a spouse’s outside options (last
term in (3)). For this reason two sets (husband and wife) of indicators for the
spouses’ occupations are included in the models we estimate. Additionally the in-
formation embodied in our distance measures could be related to the variability
and co-variability of occupational earnings. These should not be confused with
measurements of match quality, which is how we would like to interpret the ef-
fects of the distance measures. Consequently measures of each spouse’s occupa-
tion’s (intertemporal real) earnings variance and the pairwise covariance are
included in the model to control for any link between the O*Net distances and
correlated earnings. The March CPS (1971–2012) is used to calculate the variances
and covariance statistics (King, et al. 2012)6.
We estimate β in the probit equation (5), calculating marginal effects for the dis-
tance measures from the estimates. The estimated marginal effects show whether
having dissimilar occupations is bad for marital stability. As Table 2 shows, the 4
files' distance measures are not pairwise collinear, and we can estimate distinct ef-
fects of Knowledge distance and Activities distance, for example. Since the data in-
clude multiple (2003 and 2005) observations of the same households, all standard
errors reported are calculated based on clusters for each household. All marginal ef-
fects reported are with respect to the probability of dissolution, i.e., positive effects
are destabilizing.
Table 2 Summary statistics for and correlation measures among distance measures
Summary statistics
Distance measure Number combinations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Abilities 126,253 0.1416 0.0527 0 0.4168
Activities 126,253 0.2217 0.0708 0 0.5679
Knowledge 126,253 0.1796 0.0694 0 0.5766
Skills 126,253 0.3014 0.0831 0 0.6630
Overall 126,253 0.4438 0.1218 0 1.0070
Correlation structure
Distance measure Abilities Activities Knowledge Skills Overall
Abilities 1.000
Activities 0.701 1.000
Knowledge 0.803 0.761 1.000
Skills 0.590 0.647 0.656 1.000
Overall 0.812 0.877 0.880 0.895 1.000
These statistics are calculated prior to matching the distance measures to the PSID data. Hence they are not weighted to
account for the prevalence of spousal pairings in occupation, i.e., the statistics treat all pairs as equally probable and
attach equal weight. Our intention when reporting the measures of association is to show that each pair of measures is
positively correlated and measures dissimilarity, but several pairs, such as Activities and Knowledge are far from perfectly
correlated. Those two measures are capturing different dimensions of dissimilarity.
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have only one employed spouse. Consequently the distance between the spouses’ occu-
pations is not observed. It prompts the question: how far away from the employed
spouse’s occupation would the non-employed spouse’s occupation be if they were to
work? To address this problem, we attempt two separate fixes:
1. use the non-working spouse’s first full time (adult) occupation in place of the
current occupation when calculating distances, and
2. use the non-working spouse’s first occupation to identify a probabilistic current oc-
cupation and measure distance based on the expected occupation.
Resolving the issue of single earner households is crucial because there is reason to be-
lieve that single earner households would match differently based on the underlying attri-
butes proxied by occupations. The single earners are demonstrably specializing in labor
market and home production—whereas the dual earners demonstrate shared consump-
tion or productivity, as advanced by Clark & Kanbur or Benham. It is conceivable that the
former group sorts negatively (e.g., on wages) and the latter group sorts positively.
Of the 1427 single earner observations in the sample, we can estimate 1068 of their
distance measures using the first full-time occupation for the non-working spouse, and
we can estimate 1070 of them using the probabilistic approach (occupation with high-
est probability conditional on first full-time occupation). Though both methods yield
similar probit results, number two is particularly attractive since it relies on revelations
of the occupations that working spouses have joined and presumably non-working
spouses would join. Number two is less direct in this regard, but it allows for the possi-
bility of career progression in the interim between the first job and the present. The
probabilistic occupation is the present occupation with the highest probability of selec-
tion, conditional on the individual’s first full-time occupation.
Van Kammen and Adams IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 11 of 182014, 3:9
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/95. Results
5.1 Dual earner households
As a convenient point of departure, we present the results of the probit divorce model
using the sample of married households for which we observe distance. The coefficient
on “overall distance” between spouses’ occupations is not significant in this model.
However if the 4 constituent distance measures are included individually, two of them
(activities and knowledge) have significant coefficients. We report these results on
Table 3 in columns 1 and 2.
We report the marginal effects of the distance measures on Table 3. They are calculated
as the effect on the probability of dissolution (separation or divorce). These show that dis-
tance between activities of the spouses’ jobs is bad for the match in terms of divorce. Dis-
tance between the required knowledge is good for the match in terms of fewer divorces.
In the interest of brevity, the tables only contain the binary probit results, but we have
also estimated them as ordered probits, binary logits and ordered logits, and the estimates
are materially the same. An additional check we performed was splitting this sample into
households with at least one (alternative: neither) college graduate spouse. The findings
are robust to this; the primary distinction is that knowledge distance has a statistically
stronger stabilizing effect for couples composed of at least one college graduate.5.2 Single earner households
We next proceed to analyzing the results for single-earner households. Again looking
at households where only one person works can provide an even cleaner test of the
marital theories. Households have already revealed a preference for specializing in
home and market work if only one works. Thus, any remaining influence of theTable 3 Divorce model: dual earner households: marginal effects of distance measures
Probit
Dependent variable: divorce (=1) 1 2
Overall Distance 0.0328 -
(0.0266) -
Ability Distance - 0.1244
- (0.1040)
Activities Distance - 0.1623**
- (0.0749)
Skills Distance - 0.0755
- (0.0895)
Knowledge Distance - −0.1972***
- (0.0617)
Household-Year Pairs 4141 4141
Includes Controls Yes Yes
Includes Occupation Indicators (Both Spouses) Yes Yes
Log Likelihood −629.43 −622.38
Pseudo R Squared 0.1046 0.1146
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All standard errors are cluster robust. Marginal effects refer to the effect on the
probability of dissolution (y = 1). In the interest of brevity, the coefficient estimates on other covariates are relegated to a
table in the Additional file 1: Appendix.
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among spouses that might explain the strength of marriages.
The lack of current occupational information for one spouse, however, requires us to
construct the distance measures from partial information. One strategy to deal with
single earner households is to predict how far away from one another their occupations
would be, conditional on their other characteristics. This would amount to an out-of-
sample prediction of the distances (“distance hats”) using information from the 2 earner
sub-sample. Among the significant questions about the validity of such a procedure, it
ignores any information contained in the working spouse’s occupation. We observe the
location of that spouse’s occupation within the space, which should reveal something
about the location of the other spouse’s occupation. Some occupations are in densely
populated parts of the space and are close to many other occupations, whereas others
are remotely located within the space.
Our preferred strategy for treating single earner households estimates the occupation
instead of the distance; then the distance is measured from the observed occupation to
the synthetic one. The PSID contains the first full-time occupation of the respondents,
and one could simply use that occupation in place of the unobserved current occupa-
tion. Estimates of the divorce model using this method are in Table 4. This result is
consistent with the two earner sample in terms of the signs on the marginal effects, but
the estimates are less precise. The single earner sample’s estimates find a stronger de-
stabilizing effect for activities distance, and it does not find the dual earner sample’s sta-
bilizing effect of knowledge distance.
The second and third columns on Table 4 allow for the likelihood that individuals travel
along paths of occupations that are predictable based on their first full-time occupations.
Identifying the occupation with the highest probability conditional on the first occupationTable 4 Divorce model using first full-time occupation and probabilistic occupation for
one earner households
Dependent variable: divorce (=1) 1 2 3
Ability Distance Marginal Effect −0.3410 −0.1388 −0.0091
(0.2112) (0.1818) (.1898)
Activities Distance Marginal Effect 0.2332 0.1720 0.1844
(0.1052)** (0.1101) (.1077)*
Skills Distance Marginal Effect 0.3506 0.0199 −0.0475
(0.1233)*** (0.1268) (.1103)
Knowledge Distance Marginal Effect −0.0041 −0.0866 −0.1060
(0.0982) (0.0898) (.0753)
Sample 1 Earner Married 1 Earner Married 1 Earner Married
Missing Occupation First Full Time Probabilistic Probabilistic
Household-Year Pairs 1068 1070 1070
Includes Controls Yes Yes Yes
Includes Occupation Indicators
(Both Spouses)
Yes Yes Yes; Interact with Indicator
for Employed (=1)
Log Likelihood −113.76 −120.68 −118.10
Pseudo R Squared 0.3457 0.2930 0.3082
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Cluster (household) robust standard errors for the marginal effects in parentheses. A
positive marginal effect signifies an increased probability of dissolution.
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the present period. Using the probabilistic occupation yields comparable estimates to the
first full-time occupation; the marginal effects are similar except for the disappearance of
the destabilizing effect of skills distance. Additionally the signs on the activities and know-
ledge effects match the signs from the two earner sample. But their precision is sensitive
to whether or not the occupation indicators switch on for spouses that only probabilistic-
ally (not actually) work in the occupation (columns 2 and 3).
Finally we present the estimates on the pooled sample using these methods to address
missing distances. Since this includes both types of households, we include an indicator
for the single earner sub-sample. This indicator turns out to have a statistically insignifi-
cant effect on divorce probability, but it is reassuring to know that we control for differ-
ences, i.e., in marital attitudes or values, in the two sub-samples. We also interact that
indicator with the four distance measures and test whether the effect of distance on mari-
tal stability differs for the two groups. We do not reject (far from it, actually) the null hy-
pothesis that the effect is equal for both groups in the sample (Table 5). This test confirms
the primary conclusion: regardless of whether both spouses work, similarities between their
vocational activities stabilize the marriage, and similarities between their vocational know-
ledge destabilize the marriage. A full set of estimates is contained in a very large table in
the Additional file 1: Appendix; it includes all of the explanatory variables from the models
on Table 3 and Table 6 except for occupation indicators (because of their large number).
And the results hold if we restrict the sample to households in which neither spouse
has changed his or her occupation since marriage (column 3, Table 6). This is gratifyingTable 5 Wald tests of differences by household type
Divorce model interaction terms 1 2 3
Activities Distance 2 Earner 0.1621** 0.1740** 0.3400*
(.075) (.0749) (.1942)
1 Earner 0.1272 0.1965* 0.3869*
(.1063) (.1132) (.221)
Chi Squared 0.08 0.03 0.03
Knowledge Distance 2 Earner −0.1857*** −0.2056*** −0.3389**
(.0605) (.0609) (.1527)
1 Earner −0.1441 −0.1560 −0.2957
(.0937) (.091) (.2089)
Chi Squared 0.15 0.23 0.03
Sample 1 and 2 Earners Pooled 1 and 2 Earners Pooled Pooled, Non-Changers
Missing Occupation First Full Time Probabilistic Probabilistic
Household-Year Pairs 5210 5212 1081
Includes Controls Yes Yes Yes
Includes Occupation Indicators (Both
Spouses)
Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood −769.71 −770.96 −190.09
Pseudo R Squared 0.1190 0.1145 0.1897
This table shows the marginal effects of the two significant distance measures by household type (single and dual earners).
A positive marginal effect signifies an increased probability of dissolution. Both columns are derived from the estimates on
Table 6, estimating marginal effects for the two groups using group-specific covariate means. The Chi Squared statistic tests
the null hypothesis that both groups’ marginal effects are equal. Cluster (household) robust standard errors for the marginal
effects in parentheses. The emphasis is on the non-significance of the Chi Squared statistics, which leads us to not reject the
null hypothesis that distance has a common effect on marital stability for both types of households.
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the occupation space after marriage, possibly as a reaction to learning about their
match quality.
5.3 Discussion
The empirical results state that knowing, or if necessary estimating from past occupa-
tions, two spouses’ current occupations, helps predict whether their marriage will dis-
solve. Specifically more dissimilar occupations in terms of activities destabilize a
marriage, and more dissimilar occupations in terms of knowledge stabilize a marriage.
This finding is apparent among households with either one spouse or two spouses
employed, as well as both groups pooled together. It is found consistently using mul-
tiple methods for estimating missing occupations in single earner households.
What do these dissimilarity measures mean for the several theories of marriage? An
inference may be made by examining the descriptions of the O*Net variables in the ap-
pendix. As the broad categories suggest, activities consist of actions workers perform
on their jobs, and knowledge consists of the content information needed to perform
each job successfully. Occupation choices reflect one’s preferences over the activities
performed on the job and one’s comparative advantage with respect to the knowledge
required. A worker with a given set of knowledge can be expected to gravitate toward
an occupation that entails performing relatively pleasurable activities. Similarly a
worker with a given set of preferences over activities can be expected to choose an oc-
cupation at which he possesses masterful knowledge. Applying this interpretation to
spouses’ occupational distance measures, spouses who perform similar activities atTable 6 Divorce model using probabilistic occupation for one earner households, pooled
sample
Dependent variable: divorce (=1) 1 2 3
Ability Distance Marginal Effect 0.0641 0.0912 −0.4518*
(.0976) (.0947) (.2354)
Activities Distance Marginal Effect 0.1550** 0.1787*** 0.3518**
(.0644) (.0649) (.156)
Skills Distance Marginal Effect 0.1059 0.0505 0.3797**
(.0771) (.0791) (.1685)
Knowledge Distance Marginal Effect −0.1772*** −0.1954*** −0.3280***
(.0533) (.0539) (.1279)
Sample 1 and 2 Earners
Pooled




Missing Occupation First Full Time Probabilistic Probabilistic
Household-Year Pairs 5210 5212 1081
Includes Controls Yes Yes Yes
Includes Occupation Indicators (Both
Spouses)
Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood −769.71 −770.96 −190.09
Pseudo R Squared 0.1190 0.1145 0.1897
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Cluster (household) robust standard errors for the marginal effects in parentheses. A
positive marginal effect signifies an increased probability of dissolution. The marginal effects are "grand margins". The
group marginal effects are shown and tested for equality on the next table. "Non-changers" (column 3) refers to
households in which neither spouse has changed occupations since marriage.
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knowledge are treated as having similar comparative advantages. These interpretations
therefore allow a way of testing the theories of marriage.
The effect of increased occupational distance on the probability of marital dissolution
could have several explanations. First, they could reveal something about the earnings
of the occupations that transcends the individuals’ observed earnings, i.e., volatility, ex-
pectations, or correlation. Characteristics of one’s occupational earnings profile enter
the marital gains function separately from the effect of match quality. Second, occupa-
tions could reveal the values of spouses’ options outside of marriage. Third, they could
reveal match quality directly by capturing non-redundant household capital and over-
lapping preferences for household goods, as described in the preceding paragraph. This
is the interpretation we endorse, considering that the estimates we present condition
on the chosen occupations themselves, their earnings variance, and their covariance.
We separate the third explanation from the first and second by controlling for major
occupation group effects from both spouses, i.e., indicators such as 1[husband’s occupa-
tion is “Construction Trades”], and measures of both spouses’ detailed occupations’ time
series earnings variance, as well as the covariance of earnings for their occupation pair.
The effects of the distance measures persist, even with occupation and occupation pair-
specific covariates, convincing us that they capture something about the match itself, and
the risk of confusing them with insurance against earnings risks and marital opportunity
costs is minimal. The obvious candidates for what they reveal about the match are the
spouses’ household comparative advantages and preference compatibility.
The stabilizing effect of similar activities supports theories of marriage predicated
upon preferences for household (especially non-rival) goods. The results suggest that
spouses are better matched when their preferences for activities overlap. We caution
that preferences for work activities must be representative of preferences for goods to
make this conclusion truly sound. Models of marriage based on non-rival household
goods fit nicely with this result since they are particularly likely to be experiential in
nature, e.g., leisure activities and spending time with children. Preferences for these
non-rival household activities therefore would reasonably be assumed to be related
to preferences for work activities. This is reflected strongly in our results as the results
hold regardless of whether the spouses are currently working. Thus, preferences proxied
by past occupational experiences do not yield notably different results than estimates
using current occupation.
Models of marriage based on specialization gain support from our findings as well.
Spouses with relatively distant (non-redundant) knowledge are less likely to divorce,
even if both of them work instead of fully availing themselves of specialization. Notably
knowledge distance is even more important to households in which both spouses work.
The finding that non-redundant knowledge benefits dual earning couples, however,
suggests that there is some household production that involves both spouses and in-
creases with the diversity of the spouses’ knowledge. A more subtle question (suggested
by Lam (1988)) that is not answered is whether the stabilizing effect for single earners
originates from home production of a non-rival household good or whether those
goods are purchased à la Lam’s preliminary (pp. 471–72) model. There is no clear sup-
port for a productivity-enhancing effect of spousal knowledge—at least not directly on
divorce probability. If one spouse is benefiting from the knowledge of the other, the
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knowledge means less stability in our model.
It is also interesting to note that occupational earnings covariance stabilizes a mar-
riage. Its effect is same-signed and statistically significant in the two earner sample and
the pooled sample. This could be because both occupations are trending upward (part
of the reason their earnings are correlated) and the expected earnings growth increases
marital gains. Other speculations are possible, as well, but at face value this evidence
downplays occupational diversification as a method for combating earnings risk in a
marriage. It leaves as a more plausible explanation that the different knowledge repre-
sented by the spouses’ current occupation choices is complementary in providing
household goods.
Finally the results of this paper speak to some of the issues raised by Lich-Tyler
(2003) and Clark and Kanbur (2004), respectively. Specifically they show both the in-
creasing importance of preference-based matching when incomes are higher and the
increasing possibility of mismatch when household public goods are relatively more im-
portant. The first follows from a de-emphasis on home production in favor of purchas-
ing household goods as incomes rise. Since the specialization motive for matching to a
spouse becomes less pronounced, it becomes increasingly important to agree with one’s
spouse in terms of shared consumption preferences. The second comes from spousal
sorting that emphasizes the distributions of tastes among the two sexes. If the distribu-
tions do not overlap sufficiently, the outer tails of the two groups get matched together
in Clark and Kanbur’s model, i.e., couples with opposing preferences. These heteroge-
neous couples are marginally matched and vulnerable to separation. A specification in-
cluding an interaction between the distance measures and household income may
illuminate the first question, and a version including measures of how idiosyncratic
each spouse’s job is may reveal the degree of preference mismatch.6. Conclusions
When pop singer Paula Abdul and a cartoon cat depicting the male lead performed
the song, “Opposites Attract” (1990), they were right and wrong about marriage. An
idea as old as comparative advantage dictates that opposites attract in order to reap
the greatest gains from specialization. Our findings confirm that spouses with dissimi-
lar knowledge are better matched, other things equal. However, more usually the
phrase refers to opposites on personal dimensions. In this paper those interpersonal
sources of attraction are measured as dissimilarity of activities revealed through
choice of occupation. In this context, opposite preferences for activities repel, other
things equal.
Previous theoretical work by economists has predicted the findings in this paper—
that similar preferences likely generate substantial marital gains, but specialization in
disparate tasks generates marital gains as well. Taken as a whole, the results of this
study empirically support each hypothesis. The reader should be cautioned that the
credible interpretations of the two significant distance measures we advance are predi-
cated on assumptions that knowledge and preferences over activities are revealed
through occupation choice and that they translate into preferences and productive in-
puts for household goods.
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1And an expansive literature explores marital stability, as well as the related questions
of spousal matching and gains from marriage. A complete review is beyond the scope
of this paper, but a comprehensive review can be found in Lehrer (2003).
2A meta-analysis and review are in Sheu, et al. (2010).
3A summary of these is located online: http://www.onetcenter.org/dl_files/Content-
Model_Detailed.pdf.
4“An occupation expert is a person who has several years of experience and training
in an occupation. He or she has the expert knowledge required to respond to questions
about the skills, knowledge and activities required for work in the occupation” (https://
onet.rti.org/faq_oe.cfm#Q5).
5Though not reported in the paper, the results are also robust to a binary divorce
variable in which all couples that separate or divorce are coded as “1” and only those
that remain married and non-separated are coded as “0”. The results, which we do not
report in the paper, are comparable if the model is specified as an ordered probit (mar-
ried, separated, divorce in that order) as well.
6The annual average real earnings are calculated for each occupation-year. They are
expressed as natural logs, de-meaned (cross-sectionally), and then used to calculate
variance (per occupation’s time series) and covariance (per pair of occupations):
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